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Introduction to the outdoor learning session 
 
In this essay/lesson, we will articulate some practical applications of an approach to 
environmental education that embraces an ontological turn in contemporary Western 
philosophy. Ivakhiv (2014) summarises this turn as an “‘ontopolitical’ milieu of 
contemporary social, cultural, and environmental theory, critical realism, agential realism, 
nonrepresentation theory, enactive and embodied cognitivism, post-phenomenology, 
multispecies ethnography, integral ecology, and various forms of ‘new materialism’, 
‘geophilosophy,’ and ‘cosmopolitics’.” (p. 1). These approaches, related to each other by 
their attention to non-dualist, new materialist and immanent conceptions of reality, are 
discussed in the literature as salient to broad realms of investigation including science, 
politics and education (Barad, 2007; Coole & Frost, 2010; St Pierre, 2004).  
More concisely, the material turn has been highlighted as being of particular 
significance to environmental education as a ready paradigm that decolonialises, 
dehierarchicalises and deterritorialises essentialist conceptions of the human relationship to 
the environment (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, 2015). These properties are of particular 
importance in overcoming the limitations of sustainability education practice that 
straightforwardly seeks to tackle the crisis of perception of disconnection from nature. 
Identifying that the prevailing modernist malaise of disconnection is a mere presumption - 
resultant of underlying metaphysical assumptions - leads to a questioning of environmental 
education’s (re)connect to nature practices. Mannion, Fenwick & Lynch (2013) for instance, 
note how the popular focus on place-responsive education for socioecological justice 
education can be aligned with emerging posthuman debates that attend to the sociomaterial 
nature of reality. Noel Gough has sought to bring this understanding to environmental and 
outdoor education theory and research, stating that: 
 
posthuman/place relations are not about individual subjects autonomously 
forming and developing relations with the world but, rather, about realizing that 
these relations always already exist, and might be as much influenced by the 
behaviour of other materials in places we inhabit as they are by our intentional or 
unintentional actions. (Gough, 2015, p. 160) 
 
Previously we have sought to demonstrate how a move from a metaphysics of transcendence, 
to a metaphysics of immanence in environmental education practice can help overcome the 
limitations of, and possible damage resultant from, pointillist (i.e. emphasising subjects and 
objects which are then connected) theory and practice, suggesting the need for a praxis of 
participation and performativity that moves beyond these essentialist notions (Clarke & 
Mcphie, 2014). 
Here we seek to continue the critique of pointillist environmental education 
approaches by arguing that phenomena such as plants, trees, stones, clouds, rainbows, 
humans, plastic bags and smart phones are not objects or subjects that interact, relate or even 
connect with each other but are rather transient, enactive physical processes continuously 
taking place and always becoming as intra agencies; better described as haecceities (a things 
thisness) rather than quiddities (a things whatness). Perceptions of these entities as objects is 
resultant of an anthropocentric, perceptual and temporal discrepancy that has arisen from 
concepts that have been passed along ecological lines of (predominantly) Western culture 
(such as binary bias, essentialism, Platonic idealist/logocentric discourse, transcendentalism, 
Cartesian duality and Newtonian science). The material turn’s philosophy of intra-relational 
process materialism counters these ontologies and offers a new direction for thought, one that 
is partly exemplified through both historical and current (even new) animistic practices. This 
potential paradigm shift also has implications for pragmatic changes to existing pedagogies to 
support a relatively empathetic and sustainable present/future for the planet. Ultimately, we 
are concerned with helping learners, and ourselves, to continue to wonder at the becoming of 
the world.  
In this paper we take the reader on a walk in a local park with some of our students to 
help explore the process-relational world becoming in contrast to more prevalent and 
dominant conceptions of the human relationship to the environment. Like any good lesson we 
shall learn with (rather than about) the world as we go. 
 
Background reading to the lesson: Process-relational thought 
 
Adrian Ivakhiv (2013) suggests that process-relational thought focuses on “the dynamism by 
which things are perpetually moving forward, interacting, and creating new conditions in the 
world” and on the “world-making creativity of things: on how things become rather than 
what they are, on emergence rather than structure” (p. 43). He goes on to state that this 
process-relational reality “is constituted, at its core, not by objects, permanent structures, 
material substances, cognitive representations, or Platonic ideas or essences, but by relational 
encounters or events” (Ivakhiv, 2013, p. 43). This ontology has been adopted by new 
materialist authors such as, Coole & Frost (2010), Bennett (2010), Barad (2007) and 
Connolly (2011) who have taken various process-relational approaches and have reflected on 
the subtleties, differences and broader implications of this material turn. 
However, this ontology is not new. The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus (535-475 
BCE) purported that a person cannot put their foot in the same river twice (Poster, 1996) and 
the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna’s (150-250 CE) ‘middle way’ demonstrated 
interconnectedness within his “central concept of the ‘emptiness (sunyata) of all things 
(dharmas),’ which pointed to the incessantly changing and so never fixed nature of all 
phenomena” as well as a “lack of autonomous existence (nihsvabhava).” (Berger, 2003, para. 
1).  
A not too dissimilar ontology is also understood and enacted in many animist 
traditions around the world, such as First Nation cultures in the America’s, Maori culture, 
Aboriginal Australian culture and eco-paganism (Harvey, 2006). Similar to much animistic 
thought and practice, continental philosophers Deleuze & Guattari (2004) advise us “to 
regard the animal as a going on: not as a living thing of a certain kind but as the manifestation 
of a process of becoming, of continuous creation, or simply of being alive” (in Ingold, 2011, 
p. 174). For example, they suggest wolfing as an alternative to wolf. This perspective 
supports a philosophy of immanence and bares a strong resemblance to non-
romanticised/spiritualised
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 animistic practices throughout the world both past and present. 
Ingold (2011) states, “We ourselves might speak of having seen an owl, or several owls but 
the Koyukon name does not really refer to the owl as an object, but to what we might call the 
activity of ‘owling’” (p. 170).  
 
In the west we are accustomed to thinking of animals as ‘living things’, as though 
life were an interior property of a class of objects deemed ‘animate’ and that 
causes them to act in particular ways. In Koyukon ontology, by contrast, each 
animal is the instantiation of a particular way of being alive – a concentration of 
potential and a locus of growth in that entire field of relations that is life itself 
(Ingold 2000a: 95–98). The names of animals, then, do not refer to classes of 
objects, for in the Koyukon world there are no objects as such to classify. They 
refer, rather, to ways of living. (Ingold, 2011, p. 170) 
 
Paraphrasing the archetypal psychologist James Hillman, Harding (2006) suggests that “any 
phenomenon has the capacity to come alive and to deeply inform us through our interaction 
with it, as long as we are free of an overly objectifying attitude” (p. 27). This is not the same 
as the common colonialist misconception of animism as a “projection of human feelings onto 
inanimate matter.” (Harding, 2006, p. 27). Advocated by philosophers such as Spinoza, 
Leibniz and Whitehead, one view of animism has been described by Harding (2006) as 
recognising “that the material world around us has always been a dimension of sensation and 
feelings-albeit sensations that may be very different from our own-and that each entity must 
be treated with respect for its own kind of experience.” (p. 28). However, a ‘new animism’ 
may also be described as “learning how to be a good person in respectful relationships with 
other persons…only some of whom are human.” (Harvey, 2006, p. xi). The recent publication 
of Graham Harvey’s (ed.) The Handbook of Contemporary Animism (2013), reflects a 
(re)newed scholarly interest in animist ontologies. Harvey is joined by such renowned 
company as Bird-David, Descola, Abram, Ingold and Plumwood, to name just a few (forty-
one authors tackle the forty chapters of the book), in advocating an increased engagement 
with animism in order to (re)imagine a more animated human relationship with a world 
becoming. 
This animistic worldview runs counter to the majority of current unsustainable 
conceptual processes and practices that stem from the Western mind/worldview (Ingold, 
2011), a mechanised mode of thinking that has a long history incorporating various 
landmarks of change. In his book, The Participatory Mind (1994), Henryk Skolimowski 
described four stages of Western thought; Mechanos (after the Enlightenment), Theos (after 
the Roman invasions), Logos (post-Socratic thought) and Mythos (Pre-Socratic thought). 
These stages all denote important changes in conception, perception and behaviour. We 
would also include the agricultural revolution as a fundamental change in Western thought 
due to changes in social and environmental equity as well as a more static understanding of 
the world compared to the mobile nomadic view (Mcphie, 2014a). Of particular interest to us 
is the change from animistic Celtic perceptions and practices to Roman and Roman Christian 
ones. The Greeks and Romans had become urban cultures (further developing the 
alphabetised written language we use in the modern Western world) whereas the Celts 
comprised of predominantly pastoral cultures. As the Celts had an oral tradition, the Romans 
translated and interpreted many Celtic conceptions, a practice called interpretatio romana 
(Green, 1997), in a static, essentialised and transcendent manner.  
 
In her book ‘Exploring the World of the Druids’, archaeologist Miranda Green 
(1997) emphasises that the Celtic spirit/god ‘Taranis’ name indicates not that he 
was the god of thunder: he was thunder; Sequana was the River Seine at its spring 
source; Sulis was the hot spring at Bath, not simply its guardian or possessor’ (p. 
24). This suggests that whilst the animistic Celtic belief system was still very 
much of the land, the Roman introduction of a monotheistic Christian belief in a 
transcendent God began to cultivate a belief, in the West, of separation and 
division (although it could be argued that this belief of separation had already 
begun with the agricultural revolution). (Mcphie, 2015, p. 228) 
 
Through this attempt at translation, meaning was changed or lost. We emphasise Green’s 
(1997) point again, Taranis was not the god of thunder, he was thunder. This nuanced 
understanding is the difference between two wildly conflicting worldviews and has 
significant ramifications for the modern globalised world. It is the difference between an 
immanent worldview and a transcendent worldview; a world of presenting and unfolding 
perception-and-life, and a world of dead things and human representation. It is the difference 
between a flat ecological perspective (see de Vega, n. d.) and both a shallow ecological and 
deep ecological perspective. It is the difference between understanding ourselves as of the 
world, as opposed to in or on the world.     
Process-relational thought/process metaphysics has also partly matured from a variety 
of similar ontologies that have emerged from/through a number of Western and Eastern 
philosophers. It has arisen and progressed at different moments throughout history
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 and is 
written/recorded in the philosophies of Heraclitus, Nagarjuna, Zhuang Zhu, Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Schelling, Bergson, Peirce, James, Dewey, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Simondon, Bateson, 
Deleuze, Guattari, Rescher, Weber, Faber, Connolly, Stengers, Massumi, Latour and in 
certain respects Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (list taken from Ivakhiv, 2013, pp. 
42-43).  
In addition, General Systems theories (developed as systems biology by von 
Bertalanffy in 1928) played an increasingly important role in process-relational thought from 
the 1970’s onwards from Lovelock’s Gaia (Lovelock, 1972; Lovelock & Margulis, 1974) to 
Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis (1972), thus informing Capra’s Web of Life (1996), 
Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous (1996) and Harding’s Animate Earth (2006). Gregory 
Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972) is an obvious link between systems thinking, 
process-relational thought and theories of extended cognition as he has been influential in all 
of these areas of study. 
From the initial feelers tentatively extended within externalist philosophy in the 
nineteen-eighties, a number of new theoretical frameworks have arisen such as, extended 
cognition (Clark, 1997, 2001, 2008; Wheeler, 2005; Rowlands, 2009, 2010; Menary, 2006, 
2010; and Manzotti, 2006), embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2010; Chemero, 2009; Rowlands, 
1999; Anderson, 2003; Chiel & Beer, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987) and 
enactive cognition (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Thompson 
& Stapelton, 2009; Thompson, 2007; Stewart, Gappene & di Paolo (eds.), 2010; Noë, 2009; 
& di Paolo, 2009) (list taken from Malafouris, 2013, pp. 57-58). Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) 
The Extended Mind (where cognition is conceived as a transcranial process) and Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch’s (1991) The Embodied Mind (where the body is seen as a lived, 
experiential structure as well as the context of cognitive mechanisms) seem to have had 
significant and lasting impacts on theories of mind.  
Such is the potential of emerging theories (and science) of mind that a recent edition 
of New Scientist featured an article (Spinney, 2014) discussing the possibilities that extended 
theories of mind bring to the hard problem of consciousness – where is the mind? Indeed, this 
novel topological conception of the mind is now spilling into other areas of study, including 
anthropology (Hutchins, 2010; Ingold, 2011), archaeology (Tilley, 1994; Wylie, 2002) and 
mental health and wellbeing (Fuchs, Sattel & Henningsen, 2010; Mcphie, 2013, 2014a, 
2014c), even encouraging Mcphie (2013, 2014c) to suggest that if mental health is a 
transcranial process then more haecceitically apt questions to ask would perhaps be where or 
when is mental health as opposed to what, why or how questions often found in normative 
mental health research. 
The opposition to Cartesian duality is a prominent feature of these various approaches 
to process-relational paradigms. Gilbert Ryle coined the phrase, Ghost in the Machine in his 
book The Concept of Mind (1949) to describe the absurdity of Rene Descartes mind-body 
dualism. Ryle (1949) suggests that it is a category mistake to subject the mind to the same 
logical categorisation as either idealist arguments (reducing physical reality to the same 
ontological status as mental reality) or materialist arguments (reducing mental reality to the 
same ontological status as physical reality) (Roger, 2008). However, a new materialist 
comprehension of the world would differ from either of these descriptions as in many cases it 
takes an intra over an inter understanding of reality.  
 
Barad (2003) coined the term ‘intra-action’ to replace ‘inter-action’ in order to 
highlight that agencies do not precede encounters, but rather that agency emerges 
from the relationships between components […] Barad (2003, p.817) also points 
out that, ‘[a]gential intraactions are specific causal material enactments that may 
or may not involve humans’. (Poole, 2014, p. 6) 
 
If we are of the world, as opposed to in or on it, then we may place both mind and material in 
the same arena yet at the same time realise that mind is haecceitically different and that it is 
useful in its existence to aid discussions that try to clarify a more nuanced grasp of reality. 
Rather than attempting to break down meanings into categories, essentialising and atomising 
through taxonomies, rules and regulations, we may think in terms of stories that use metaphor 
and analogy to explore different understandings of the world.  
So, instead of performing an extended literature review on this emerging world view 
(see Clarke & Mcphie, 2014 for an initial exploration of process-relational philosophy in 
outdoor environmental education for sustainability) we shall attempt to explain this 
alternative ontological paradigm through a pragmatic approach that focuses on a single 
outdoor learning session of encounters in a park.  Each encounter has a story to tell about our 
embodied material intra-relation with/of the world. The first part of this session is a ghost 
story. You (the facilitator) may wish to build a campfire for this part of the session, or begin 
in a cave (it is a ghost story after all!). 
 
THE OUTDOOR LEARNING SESSION 
 
9am. Ghost in the Machine 
 
Good morning everyone. Before we begin, we want you to imagine a ghost rattling around in 
your brain. In your Pineal gland to be precise. It has no material quality to it, no physical 
substance and so is similar to a ghost. Descartes knew dogs had pineal glands also but did not 
believe they had this extra quality of mind to them that humans had and so thought them 
soulless as he did every other creature (justifying vivisection amongst the enlightened 
scientists). This perception is still very evident in the modern Western world. For example, 
‘does anyone here believe in ghosts?’ A few students raise their hands. ‘What about ghost 
blades of grass?’ One student replies, ‘of course not, they’re just plants’. This student 
believes humans are special and have souls that after death would transcend the human body 
(or brain if you believe it resides there as Descartes did). Many scientists have a similar 
anthropocentric, Cartesian understanding of the world although many may not admit that they 
believe in ghosts, although we know some that do!    
It may be argued that we should do away with the concept of the mind altogether (in 
the same manner Morton (2007) calls for the abandonment of Nature in his dark ecology) as 
it is problematic in terms of binary bias and a transcendent conception of the world. 
However, by keeping the term and putting it under erasure (sous rature), a method that 
Derrida borrowed from Heidegger to denote certain concepts as inadequate, yet necessary, or 
changing its literary definition/existence to exemplify immanence rather than transcendence, 
it could promote a deeper understanding of the immanent physical nature of the mind as 
opposed to the Cartesian non-physical, Westernised spiritual mind of transcendence. 
This transcendent thinking has led to certain ecological conceptions, prompting one 
student to say we need to be reconnected to Nature if we are to overcome the current 
environmental crisis. Indeed, some recent academic conferences are now dedicated to this 
concept, such as “Nature Connections…an interdisciplinary conference to examine routes to 
nature connectedness” (Nature Connections, 2015). Elsewhere we argue that a literal 
disconnection is impossible as we are of the same materials, forces and energies of the Earth 
(Clarke & Mcphie, 2014). Therefore, a re-connection is also impossible. However, there may 
be a conceptual (mis)understanding that influences our perception and behaviour so we come 
to believe there is a disconnection. If this is so, the perception and belief that we are not (or 
no longer) part of our environments may have unintended behavioural outcomes that 
influence and further encourage Cartesian thinking that in turn may add to destructive 
climatic and mass extinction events as well as encouraging social inequities (such as 
discrimination and intolerance). Bai (2009) demonstrates this understanding in her call for a 
re-animation of the universe through environmental education, arguing, as we do above, that 
Cartesian-dualism and logocentric Platonicism be, at the least, complemented by other forms 
of knowledge. On the part of positivists/reductionists/essentialists/realists, etc., this has 
obvious ramifications due to believing we may change our environments without it affecting 
us too much, leading to environmental degradation. On the part of 
constructivists/idealists/humanists/deep ecologists, etc., the belief that we may be, or are, 
disconnected still encourages a Cartesian dualism and therefore propagates a perception that 
humans can be separate (possibly leading to further destructive or unsustainable behaviours). 
These perceptions and beliefs have filtered through Western society, influencing schooling, 
healthcare, politics, finance, etc. This outdoor learning session/story is just one practical 
example of how we may deterritorialise this unhealthy (if we accept that a mass extinction 
would be unhealthy) situation. 
David Abram (2011) asks,  
 
What if thought is not born in the human skull, but is a creativity proper to the 
body as a whole, arising spontaneously from the slippage between the organism 
and the folding terrain that it wanders? What if the curious curve of thought is 
engendered by the difficult eros and tension between our flesh and the flesh of the 
earth? (p. 4). 
 
Let us now take a walk around the park to see if we can explore this alternative paradigm that 
Abram is hinting at. 
 
9.30am. The Secret Life of Plants 
 
So, we’re walking along with our students when we come across a Rhododendron Ponticum. 
One student, a middle-class Westerner, perceives it as beautiful. This view, possibly an 
aesthetic conception culturally constructed and passed on from the Romantic period, is a way 
of seeing that John Urry (1990) would term, a Romantic Gaze. But when asked if the 
Rhododendron thinks itself beautiful, the student replies, ‘you’re joking aren’t you? Plants 
can’t think!’  
Michael Marder (2013) complains, “If animals have suffered marginalisation 
throughout the history of Western thought, then non-human, non-animal living beings, such 
as plants, have populated the margin of the margin, the zone of absolute obscurity 
undetectable on the radars of our conceptualities” (p. 2). Yet Marder (2013, p. 152) believes 
that vegetal life has a “non-conscious intentionality” that “amounts to an essentialism-free 
way of thinking that is fluid, receptive, dispersed, non-oppositional, non-representational, 
immanent, and material-practical…”; in other words, they think! 
Now let us look at the Rhododendron from the point of view of classical science 
which has influenced ecology (evident in most Western education systems
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, including 
environmental education). The teacher might say it is a genus of flora in the kingdom of 
plants, separate but also a part of its surrounding environment. This derives from the 
Linnaeus tree of knowledge and taxonomy – that we made up! Let us deconstruct it for a 
moment: Kingdom (gender inequality), subkingdom (reductionist), superdivision 
(hierarchical), division (Cartesian binary bias), and so on… In fact, the term ecological is 
itself problematic due to its Greek etymology of logos; ways of thinking that privilege 
reasoned Western hierarchical thought over any other.  
However, the explanation we give the student could hint at the existence of the plant’s 
mind as described by Li, Clark & Winchester (2010, pp. 407-408): 
 
The way the plant knows about the environment is through its interaction with the 
environment it lives in. Hence the plant’s knowledge of its world depends on the 
environment it lives in and the actions the plant is capable of (Reid, 1995). The 
plant neither determines its world, nor is determined by it, but co-emerges with 
the world. It is important to note that there is no dichotomy (i.e. the plant and the 
environment) because any system and its context are inseparable (Fenwick, 
2000). 
 
The ecologist may perceive the Rhododendron as a threat to the ecosystem if it is intruding as 
an unwanted alien invader originating from a place where it evolved over a longer period, 
where it had time to fit in with its environment in a more sustainable manner. One student 
asks, ‘but this idea could also be used as an argument that sees Europeans as pests couldn’t 
it?’ We agree! Due to the fairly rapid colonisation period of the Americas and Australasia, for 
example, the ecosystems/environments that suffered (including processes from the biosphere, 
troposphere, hydrosphere and lithosphere) could not adapt fast enough to compete and so 
became obsolete or less than they once were (in number or in health). First Nation people are 
good examples of human processes who have been (are being) weeded or sprayed by the 
European monoculture gardeners and whose ancestors are still suffering from the hierarchical 
hegemonic power relations that unsustainable gardeners have over their biotic and abiotic 
communities.  
For example, many First Nation people were treated as unwanted pests when the 
Europeans needed a picturesque or sublime view when they fenced off Yellowstone Park to 
create America’s first national park in 1872. The area was preserved ‘for the benefit and 
enjoyment of the people’ (inscribed on the Roosevelt Arch at the North entrance to the park 
as part of the organic act legislation), yet the indigenous populations who were either from 
this region or were forced to pass through this area (for example, the Shoshone Sheep Eaters 
and the Nez Perce) did not seem to fit into the Romantic ideal of the Eurocentric concept of 
wilderness and so were removed. Although they were seen as man, they were not seen as 
human, at least not humans of the same equality or civility as humans of European descent 
(see Callicott, 2000 for an in-depth discussion of wilderness as an androcentric, colonial, 
racist and genocidal concept). These wildernesses are still heavily contested as is the Western 
post-colonial perception of indigenous people around the world and the social and 
environmental inequalities this perception (re-)enforces (for an in-depth discussion of green 
postcolonialism, see Huggan and Tiffin, 2007). 
‘But hark, what’s that I hear’ asks Dave, ‘the beautiful trill of a songbird? The flutter 
of beating wings?’ 
 
9.45am. Birds and Columns 
 
‘Look students, there’s a lapwing over there’. And by naming it so, we’ve just sucked the life 
out of it! Some call it a peewit due to its call. But that’s not all a lapwing is, a sound. Just as 
the Celts personified their environments, even old English (Anglo-Saxon) names for animals 
seem to support an immanent understanding of the world that advocates bringing the world to 
life. For example, the animated Old English verbal name for the modern English static noun 
lapwing is hlēapewince, meaning to dance or leap (hlēapan) and wink (wincian) (Clark-Hall, 
2011). Now we breathe life back into it.  
For the Koyukon of Alaska, 
 
The spotted sandpiper’s name is ‘flutters around the shore’, the osprey’s is ‘stares 
into the water’, the boreal owl’s is ‘perches in the lower part of spruce trees’, and 
the savanna sparrow’s is ‘sits on a stalk of grass. (Ingold, 2011, p. 169) 
 
These relational verbs seem to encourage a sort of sympathy and respect of/for things 
from animals to buildings.  
 
When we see the bird moving, we feel its motion; with the column, we see it 
standing still but also feel its motion and activity. The bird lives in an aesthetic 
relation with the air, as the column lives-with its adjacent partners; a difference 
only occurs at the point where aesthetics becomes a profession: the making of 
beautiful things. In short, aesthetics is something that existed long before humans 
did, exchanged between objects, but we use it to make those objects. When we 
see-feel a bird in flight, the aesthetics originates in the intensification of an 
extensive motion, but when we design a column, to make it aesthetic we must 
draw it in the realm of correspondence, and therefore as a product of motion. 
(Spuybroek, 2011, p. 183) 
 
So, the act of architecture is a relational performance between emerging events. I think we’ll 
come back to this point later in the day…you never know, we might even see some 
architects!   
Let us continue our walk because some students seem to be getting distracted by a 
faint buzzing sound nearby. 
 
10am. Wasps and Orchids 
 
Now we come across a wasp on an orchid; the wasp, an organism of fauna, of the order 
Hymenoptera; the orchid, an organism of flora. The students conceive the wasp and orchid to 
be separate entities. But continuing along the same vein of disruption, the wasp and the 
orchid together may be seen as a multiplicity or an assemblage. In Deleuze & Guattari’s 
(2004) famous description, the wasp becomes part of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus (a 
mobile sexual appendage) and the orchid becomes the sexual organ of the wasp (or an 
orgasm). The orchid does not try to attract other orchids, it flirts with the wasp! As Dema 
(2007, para. 5) notes, “this forms the wasp-orchid assemblage which operates via inorganic, 
rather than organic, life”. Our students watch the wasp-orchids for a while until one mentions 
how amazing it is to see organisms in their environments. Another students says ‘where is the 
environment, or the organism, if the two constitute each other? Are there two?’ Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch (1991) offer some insight here when they say, “organism and 
environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the fundamental 
circularity that is life itself” (p. 217).  
As a group we start walking towards a nearby group of trees, wondering about our 
assumptions of orgasms, organisms and environments. 
 
10.30am. Trees 
 
Jamie asks the students what they think a tree is. They give him funny looks! Trees are 
collectively perceived in various ways from copse to jungle, each having differing meanings 
and associations. They are a symbol of environmentalism (tree huggers) and health (green 
therapies). But most of the lessons about trees are as objects of varying species (as in the 
books I-Spy Trees and I-Spy Nature). Why not try Tim Ingold’s (2008) example instead: 
 
Where does the tree end and the rest of the world begin? ... Is the bark, for 
example, part of the tree? If I break off a piece in my hand and observe it closely, 
I will doubtless find that it is inhabited by a great many tiny creatures that have 
burrowed beneath it and made their homes there. Are they part of the tree? … If 
we consider, too, that the character of this particular tree lies just as much in the 
way it responds to the currents of wind, in the swaying of its branches and the 
rustling of its leaves, then we might wonder whether the tree can be anything 
other than a tree-in-the-air. These considerations lead me to conclude that the tree 
is not an object at all, but a certain gathering together of the threads of life. That 
is what I mean by a thing. (p. 4). 
 
Or even this account by Spuybroek (2011): 
 
The tree feels the wind, and as the tree feels, it takes on form, and as the tree 
takes on form, we start to feel it too – not physical wind but rage – and then we 
take on form by adjusting our position or posture. If I were to map out such 
relations in a diagram, with dots indicating forms and arrows indicating forces 
and feelings, we would not even be able to see the difference between animate 
and inanimate things … sympathy only appears when the dualism disappears, at 
the point where things become feelings and feelings things. (pp. 182-183). 
 
Even if we dismiss all anthropocentric subjectivity (as a tree is perceived differently to each 
person, at every age, in every class, from each culture, throughout history), a tree is still not a 
tree for a dog! It is an affordance. For example, it may be a message board to display its Tag 
(an extended self?). What is a tree to a jellyfish, bacteria or cell (are we not bacteria and cell 
too)? A tree as we understand it is simply an anthropocentric account, one that has changed 
and is still changing historically, geographically and culturally over time.  
And then there is the anthropocentric account of taxonomical knowledge, often 
depicted and symbolised as a tree; separating, essentialising, reducing, hierarchicalising, 
homogenising. This overuse of the tree led Deleuze & Guattari (1987, p. 15) to consider the 
world in a different way: 
 
We’re tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicals. 
They’ve made us suffer too much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, 
from biology to linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or political aside from 
underground stems and aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes. 
 
Deleuze & Guattari’s (1987) critique of the Western tree metaphor has been influential across 
diverse educational disciplines in recent years (Cousin, 2005; Johnson, 2014; Semetsky & 
Mansy, 2013; Masny, 2013). Whereas the majority of this work looks to disrupt stagnant and 
neo-liberal practices in research and the management of education, we look to use Deleuze & 
Guattari as a means to help students disrupt their own assumptions about trees, and other 
organisms they perceive to be in environments. To do this we must be careful how we word 
our ecological explanations and assumptions to our students. We must look for ways to move 
our discourse with students beyond tree metaphors and we must be mindful of our 
anthropocentricity. For example, pollution is one thing for humans but is another thing 
entirely for some forms of bacteria who thrive on it (such as Desulfitobacteria). 
Research, such as the human microbiome project (Turnbaugh et al., 2007) suggests 
that humans are supraorganisms being ninety percent microbes. Are we simply a carrying 
vessel for them or is this just another example of sub-systems (bacteria) within larger 
systems, very similar to how Gregory Bateson describes minds, as there is always “a larger 
Mind of which the individual mind is only a subsystem” (Bateson, 2000, p. 467)? Of course 
if we keep working our way up the systems, we get to the minds of forests (Kohn, 2013) and 
eventually what James Lovelock describes as Gaia, an interplay of the Earth’s biosphere, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and troposphere. But there is no need to stop at our atmosphere. The 
Universe, simply put, is a very large Mind of which humans are just a process.   
Beneath the tree the students gaze about, considering where they end and the tree 
begins. ‘There are certainly plenty of humans in this park…’ notes one of the students. 
 
11am. Humans 
 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) suggested that humans were of the world rather than in or on it! We 
are made of the materials, forces and energies of the Earth, not a separate entity that dwells 
on or in it, implying a certain literal disconnection. Harris (2008) notes that there is an 
assumption that the mind-brain-body remains somehow detached or isolated from the wider 
environment, but as we learned from Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) earlier, the organism 
is not in the environment and so the mind is not in the head. For instance Manzotti & 
Pepperell (2013, p. 3) claim that nearly 30 years of intensive study have failed to discover 
any “mental content or phenomenal experience” inside the human head and that continued 
claims that the brain is where the mind is located amount to a conceptual bias in the scientific 
community.  
‘So, to reference a Pixies song’, says one confused looking student, ‘where is my 
mind?’ 
 
Break time (please can everyone search around for this student’s mind?) 
 
11.15am. Where is my mind? 
 
Bateson concurred with Merleau-Ponty that mind is immanent in the world. Andy Clark 
follows Bateson in concluding that what we normally accept as mental processes extend 
beyond the skin bag into the local environment (Clark, 1997). “In other words, the mind does 
not inhabit the body; rather, the body inhabits the mind” (Malafouris, 2013, p. 60). Writing in 
agreement, Preston (2003) develops this discussion further by claiming that we think with 
place, and this has a fundamental impact on our being-in-the-world.  
Yet a similar type of thinking/worldview already exists within animist cultures. As 
Ingold states: 
 For the Ojibwa, knowledge is grounded in experience, understood as a coupling 
of the movement of one's awareness to the movement of aspects of the world. 
Experience, in this sense, does not mediate between mind and nature, since these 
are not separated in the first place (Ingold, 2000, p. 11). 
 
Therefore, the ecosystem that is the human is also a process of the ecosystems we generally 
think of as our external environments. This has great implications for the manner in which we 
conceive of education for, as Spuybroek (2011, p. 182) notes, “we are not recipients but 
participants”.  There is great potential, then, in exploring animistic ways of seeing in 
environmental education (Clarke, 2014; Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, 2015). 
 
11.30am. Haecceity   
 
Perceiving humans as quiddities (a things whatness) rather than haecceities (a things thisness) 
alters our perception of (and behaviour of) the world, influencing us to think of ourselves as 
separate from the processes of materiality that we are ultimately of (not a part of). The idea 
of an essential form and substance that makes us what we are – humans – partly stems from 
Platonic idealism. This has important ramifications for how we perceive and treat each other, 
as well as the world that we are of. For example, the idea that we have a static, unchangeable 
identity (an essential me to me), which has come from this essentialist mode of thinking (and 
links to binary bias), could have racist, sexist (Mcphie, 2014a) and speciesist implications. 
Arguments that education for sustainability must include social and economic aspects, as well 
as environmental, can be answered in part, by understanding that a move to immanence is 
required for not only our conceptions of the environment, but also of our social and economic 
systems. The Cartesian notion of human supremacy works across what dominant thinking 
would perceive as separate entities – the environmental, the social, the economic - leading to 
social and ecological inequity such as vivisection and class politics justifying the oppression 
of some humans over others, humans over animals, animals over plants, plants over rocks, 
etc.  
So, there seems to be much disentangling to be done regarding distinctions between 
life and non-life, or species. Yet Spuybroek (2011), examining the aesthetic ideas of John 
Ruskin, suggests that:  
 
we do not need to disentangle anything; on the contrary, the earth veil is all about 
entangling … Life is not something stored in biological creatures; hybrids or 
bastards can be more alive than the purified versions, naturally, because they are 
imperfect, wild and radically picturesque. (p. 331).  
 
However, if we thought of ourselves instead as haecceities (as championed by Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004) or as Ingold (2011) explains, Knots, where we focused on a positive 
characteristic of an individual that caused them to be this individual and no other, we may 
begin to realise the complex intra-connected nature of humans as of the environment, as 
opposed to focusing on commonalities of certain things which automatically induces a binary 
perception, thereby separating groups of things and individual things from the environments 
they are ultimately of. In turn, this fragmentation leads to destructive environmental 
behaviour as we’ve argued elsewhere (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014; Mcphie, 2014a). 
 
…the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and 
there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being inorganic. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 503)  
 
Dema (2007) directs us to the implications of Deleuze & Guattari’s conception of inorganic 
life: “It is not so much that organisms are not alive, but that life can be articulated in all 
things.” (para. 1). It is a reimagining of life that is variable in intensity, rather than a property 
that is either exclusively present or absent (Dema, 2007). 
As a haecceity, we can no longer measure ourselves as if objects of the same genetic 
species. So instead of describing what a human is (as a quiddity), an explanation for the 
students in the park may instead go something like this: 
 
The organism is no longer the paradigmatic unit of life, nor is the cell, the genetic 
code, the population, the species, or the ecosystem. The authors of A Thousand 
Plateaus are proposing an ontological theory in which everything is inorganically 
alive, everything is assembled. When a person walks into a room, when a new 
fabric touches a finger, when a star wobbles, when a molecule falls apart, when a 
mayor feels threatened, when a recipe approaches a critical threshold: in all cases 
the laws of assembling are operating and are universally applied. If we want to 
know more about how inorganic life works, the next step is to learn more about 
the mechanisms of assembling. (Dema, 2007, para. 20) 
 
So, in this paradigm we no longer have to think of ourselves as organisms. Perhaps we could 
be assemblages, haecceities or multiplicities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004); meshworks or knots 
(Ingold, 2011); cat’s cradles (Haraway, 1994); or even Mr. Messys (Mcphie, 2014a). If this is 
so, the hierarchical tree of taxonomy begins to shake. For example, human intention and 
design is highly regarded in the world of flora and fauna. Hierarchically, we are at the top of 
the tree (and even trees are above stones!)! We marvel at our invention and artistry. Just look 
at Gaudi’s fantastical cathedral or the skyscrapers of modern civilisation with their air 
conditioning…a human invention come about through sheer intentional intellectual cognitive 
brilliance! Really? We wonder if something that is usually considered as insignificant 
compared to humans in the world of cognitive functioning could also produce something 
similar? What about something really small…that we don’t have to speculate on…as they 
already exist…incredibly small architects? 
 
12pm. Termites 
 
‘Oh look class…there’s a termite…or more accurately, a colony of termites. And what’s that 
they’ve built? Wow! They also build fantastical Gaudiesque Cathedrals and skyscrapers. 
They also have aesthetic artistic design and air conditioning too? Hmmm, we’ll have to go 
back to the drawing board on this one for now!’ 
So, if we suggest that flora and fauna are not objects but processes, what about things 
that we usually perceive as static objects (at least things that are not able to move of their own 
accord…such as stones)? 
 
12.30pm. Stones 
 
‘But surely,’ one student asks, ‘stones are just stones…aren’t they?’ Ingold (2010) tells us:  
 
A rolling stone, the proverb says, gathers no moss, yet in the very process of 
gathering moss, the stone that is wedged in place becomes a thing, while on the 
other hand the stone that rolls – like a pebble washed by a running river – 
becomes a thing in its very rolling. Just as the tree, responding in its movements 
to the currents of wind, is a tree-in-the-air, so the stone, rolling in the river 
current, is a stone-in-the-water. (p. 5) 
 
‘Okay’ shrugs a student, ‘so a stone isn’t just an object separate from everything else, I get 
that. But it’s still not conscious like a human, I mean it doesn’t have agency does it?’ Rautio 
(2013) suggests stones have (intra-)agency: stones do things to us and with us: 
 
They have us pick them up, feel them, close them in our ﬁst (if particularly 
smooth and rounded) or hold them between our thumb and foreﬁnger (if small 
and edgy). They condition our walking … we exist as a consequence of stones: 
the event of carrying stones makes us in the moment … we become stone-
carrying with carrying stones. (p. 11) 
 
Some stones have even been discovered to walk, slide or sail! A number of stones at 
Racetrack Playa, Death Valley, California have been documented (Reid et al., 1995) as 
sailing across the desert floor, leaving trails like snails behind them, criss-crossing in varying 
directions depending on their destination. Rather like plants creeping around when played 
back on video at high speed, rocks also begin to become more overtly animated and slither 
around. The illusion of time deceives us all.  
We suggest that instead of introducing stones to students as inert geological objects 
made of Porous Limestone or Igneous Granite, you might try starting the students off by 
conversing with the stone through more creative means. We have found that a reading of 
Conversation with a Stone (1997 [1962]), by Wislawa Szymborska gets students talking 
about stones in very different ways. It begins, ‘I knock at the stone's front door…’ and 
continues to question the nature of Western perception, the impossibility of knowing.  
A student calls out from the back of the group, ‘What about larger stones then? What 
about mountains?’ 
 
1pm. Mountains 
 
Once again we may see them as static, immovable objects in our relatively short life spans. 
However, if we were to fix a video recorder in place to view the mountains over a few 
million years and then play it back on a very fast speed, we would see that they flow and ebb 
just the same as a river or ocean waves. In the 1800’s John Ruskin began to see the world in 
this way, in two contrasting, yet still romanticised empathies; the feeling of impressionism (as 
in Turner’s sublime landscapes) and the semi-scientific intricacies of detail (as in the Pre-
Raphaelites depictions of the environment). From his nuanced grasp of a sympathy of things 
(Spuybroek, 2011) and whilst living at Brantwood (with a view of the Old Man of Coniston, 
a mountain in the Lake District in England), Ruskin consequently saw the beginnings of 
human influences over the climate. He “foresaw climate change in The Storm-Cloud of the 
Nineteenth Century – both as a physical threat, in industrial pollution, and a metaphysical 
one, as a ‘plague cloud made of dead men’s’ souls’.” (Hoare, 2014, para. 9).  
‘Look up students; can you see the blue sky in contrast with the plague clouds 
brewing in the distance?’ 
 
2pm. Kites, Plastic bags and Weather 
 
‘So, now we have discussed the biosphere and lithosphere (if you want to reduce and separate 
them in that way), what about the troposphere or hydrosphere?’ Jamie asks the students. 
Merleau-Ponty may provide an answer. 
 
As I contemplate the blue of the sky … I abandon myself to it and plunge into 
this mystery, it 'thinks itself within me,' I am the sky itself as it is drawn together 
and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my consciousness is saturated with 
this limitless blue. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 249) 
 
Tim Ingold (2010) suggests kite flying as a way to know our weather world: “A kite-in-the-
air behaves very much like a living being. It seems to possess an agency of its own” (pp. 132-
133).  
We advise getting your students to make their own kites and then fly them whilst 
feeling the pull and push of the intra-relational processes of the wind-kite-human as they flow 
through the string into your body. 
 
the weather is not so much what we perceive, as what we perceive in. We see in 
sunlight whose shades and colours reveal more about the composition and 
textures of the ground surface than about the shapes of objects, we hear these 
textures in the rain from the sounds of drops falling on diverse materials, and we 
touch and smell in the keen wind that – piercing the body – opens it up and 
sharpens its haptic and olfactory responses. Indeed a strong wind can so 
overwhelm the senses as virtually to drown out the perception of contact with the 
ground. (Ingold, 2011, p. 131) 
 
The film American Beauty (Mendes, 1999) has a short section demonstrating exquisitely the 
flow of materialism that is usually reserved for the anthropocentric concept of life. A plastic 
bag is animated in loops of aliveness, captured on video. But it is not merely the wind that 
causes the bag to move in a linear cause-and-effect sequence essentialised under a Newtonian 
law. Rather, a play has co-emerged with the distributed agential intra-actions of vital 
materiality (a combination of Barad’s (2007) intra-actions and Bennett’s (2010) vital 
materiality). For many, this aliveness is obvious in a murmuration of starlings, for example, 
yet agential qualities of inertly conceived matter are rarely discussed in a serious manner in 
the more accepted halls of academe. Coole & Frost (2010) ask, “How could we ignore the 
power of matter and the ways it materializes in our ordinary experiences or fail to 
acknowledge the primacy of matter in our theories?” (p. 1).  
However, a challenge to the anthropocentric conception of agency is not new. It 
narratives, developed out of animal fables and oriental tales (Lamb, n. d.), were in circulation 
in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. The Golden Spy (1709) by Charles Gildon, Adventures of a 
Shilling (1710) by Joseph Addison, The Adventures of a Guinea (1760) by Charles Johnstone, 
Adventures of a Hackney Coach (1783) anonymously written and The Adventures of a Three 
Guinea Watch (1893) by Talbot Baines Reed, are examples of stories about material 
circulation (rather than production) that transformed objects into subjects (Green, 2013; 
Lamb, n. d.). Although not particularly engaging in more nuanced discussions of agential 
distribution, the stories certainly attempt to steer away from anthropocentrism (although they 
are still from an anthropocentric perspective of a non-human perspective). Arjun Appadurai’s 
(1986) The Social Life of Things was a more recent attempt at socialising materiality that 
sparked a (re)newed interest in “challenging the deeply entrenched anthropocentric idea of 
agency” (Malafouris, 2013, p. 122) and has culminated in Coole & Frost’s (eds.) New 
Materialisms (2010), a collection of posthumanist discussions about matter exhibiting agency 
and aliveness.  
Litter, waste, smart phones and other human produce are just as alive, becoming and 
natural as the more traditional and romantic conceptions of nature that our examples in this 
paper have lent towards. Although also natural, themes of homogenisation, hierarchy, 
staticization and pointillism as unsustainable concepts and practices may be more rewarding 
than one-dimensional discussions supporting re-connections to nature. The demolition of the 
nature/culture binary may appear troublesome to environmentalists, especially when post-
structuralism appears to attack the sacred borders of nature reserves or national parks 
(Mcphie, 2014b). However, the cost of retaining a distinct - and ultimately false - nature may 
be much higher, as we have explored in previous work (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014). 
As the kites and plastic bags dance of the air, one student spots a rainbow; ‘Who’s 
going to find the pot of gold at the end?’  
 
3pm. Rainbows 
 
Western intellectuals have been criticised by post-colonial theorists for depreciating non-
Western forms of knowing, by re-formulating or reducing them to folklore or myth (Said, 
1978; Sharp, 2008; Spivak, 1988). Richard Dawkins does this (a lot) in his book, The Magic 
of Reality (2011). After recounting the non-scientific stories such as Vikings seeing rainbows 
as bridges to Asgard, Dawkins states that they are merely myth and, therefore, not factual - 
whereas the Western scientific perspective derived from Newton is the only true model (pp. 
140-155). 
But in our facilitation to undergraduate students, we have often used this next 
illustration of the rainbow as an example of process externalism as it exemplifies a 
paradigmatic shift in thinking that often has dramatic consequences for the students. 
Manzotti (2011, para. 8) begins… 
 
Consider a physical phenomenon like the rainbow … a rainbow is a process that 
requires a further physical system in order to take place. Where is the rainbow? 
Where is the experience of the rainbow? Is there a rainbow without an observer? 
Is there a rainbow-observer without a rainbow in the cloud? … it is impossible, 
from a physical perspective, to disentangle the rainbow from its observer … 
Processes are necessarily private and yet physical. Secondarily, the rainbow is 
something that takes place. It is not a static entity. The rainbow takes place and it 
is extended in time and in space.  
 
So the rainbow is far from an objective or subjective phenomena. However, it could be said 
to be intersubjective-interobjective or possibly even intra-relational (Mcphie, 2015). 
Plato said, “we must carve nature at its joints” (Phaedrus 265d-266a, in Hutchins, 
2010, p. 705) but where are its joints? If we try to cut phenomena into illusory parts, what 
monsters may emerge? To categorise, cut, split, border, separate, partition, disconnect, 
connect, territorialise, hierarchicalise, homogenise, etc. would seem to place us where we are 
today, the sixth mass extinction. Gregory Bateson (1972) said that a blind man walking with 
a stick perceives through his arm, his hand, his stick, and the ground before him (tap, tap, 
tap) – to break these points apart is to place the human at the centre of a world much more 
than human.  
 
If what you are trying to explain is a given piece of behavior, such as the 
locomotion of the blind man, then for this purpose, you will need the street, the 
stick, the man, the street, the stick, and so on, round and round. (Bateson, 1972, p. 
459) 
 
4pm. Session Review  
 
Prevailing educational approaches based on objectivist understandings of the world are 
problematic on two obvious levels. Firstly they are simplistic in the way they describe the 
nature of the world: attempting to define without questioning inherent assumptions and biases 
– education of this type is indoctrination. This in itself would not be overly problematic if it 
were not that the perpetuation of this way of seeing is ultimately damaging and oppressing. It 
is our contention that our modes of conceptualising the essence of our relationships to our 
sociomaterial world have a direct influence on, or are co-emergent with, our modes of acting 
and behaving – our modes of valuing, decision-making and moving. If we ontologically 
understand the world to be essential, transcendent, objective and eternal in its form (or the 
various forms we are used to considering it; nature, forest, mind, tuna, culture) – then our 
modes of valuing, decision making and moving can in no way conceive the end of these 
forms, either through morphogenesis, or the more pressing extinction event we are 
perpetuating. More than this, in a world of eternal transcendent forms, we have no vested 
interest beyond the instrumental.  
Environmental Education is limited if it relies on moralistic calls to care for ‘the’ 
environment - as if it were an object we can reach out and touch. This is why scholars call 
time and again for a reconnection, so that caring might spring from an almost spiritual union 
between people and nature. However, a paradox emerges here, as the term reconnection 
implies separation - or distinct entities – the existence of which remain in our metaphysical 
conceptualisation of the world even when we might think we are reconnecting, and thus will 
always leak through into our choices and behaviour, resultantly justifying oppressions. We 
propose a dissolving of connection = care ideas in environmental education, instead 
(re)placing both moralistic and connection narratives with a narrative of a relationally 
underpinned metaphysics of immanence.  
As Li, Clark & Winchester (2010) state a more open, creative, process-oriented mode 
of education: 
 
offers a dynamic new vision for examining learning and performance, and 
enables us to see this field in a new light. It claims that our mind, body, and the 
world are inseparable. Learning is through the learners’ acts and is acted upon by 
the world and understanding is embedded in doing. (p. 413). 
 
The outdoor learning session we describe above is not a carefully planned pedagogical 
endeavour, rather it is a description of the wanderings of ourselves and past students as we 
have considered new materialist, poststructuralist and relevant philosophical and artistic 
accomplishments as we have engaged with our environments. But this experimentation in 
teaching and learning is a critical one, as it is through these exploratory practices that 
dominant, oppressive narratives of the nature of the human-environment condition can begin 
to be overcome.  
In the film, An Ecology Of Mind (Bateson, 2011), Nora Bateson, recollecting 
Krishnamurti’s words, said, “You might think you’re thinking your own thoughts. You’re 
not. You’re thinking your culture’s thoughts.”. However, the body is not merely a passive 
surface onto which societal meaning is inscribed (Thrift, 1997). Our cultures thoughts are our 
own thoughts, which in turn are our environments thoughts for they cannot be disentangled. 
They become. 
Class dismissed. Have a nice day. 
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NOTES 
 
1 
We understand a transcendent Westernised spirituality to differ from a more contemporary animistic 
physicalist spirituality of immanence which is partly how our session would take shape. This 
difference that we are advocating is the immanent material aliveness of things as opposed to a 
transcendent non-material spirit/soul. 
 
2 This build-up and generation of ideas acts rather like the notion of a ‘palimpsest’, a layering of 
rhizomatic conceptions that overwrite previous philosophies/landscapes/cultures and yet the ancestral 
remains may still be traced, although only faintly as a shadow or apparition to be historically 
romanticised.      
 
3 System appears under erasure as the common conception of a system is a group of interdependent 
components or parts. Whilst a philosophy of immanence supports the notion of self4-sustaining 
processes, this process would not be constructed of independently existing ‘parts’. 
 
4 Self is under erasure as the notion of a self-contained being is problematised in a philosophy of 
immanence. 
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